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apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

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An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proprotionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 248.

TABLE 23

GROWTH OF TRACTOR PARK IN EASTERN EUROPE

Country	Number of MTS		(Tractors in 1,000's by Sector)					
			MTS		State Farms		Total	
	1948/49	1952/53	1948/49	1952/53	1948/49	1952/53	1948/49	1952/53
Czechoslovakia	500	256	5.0	—	5.0	—	10.0	25.0
Poland	30	376	0.2	15.0	14.3	20.0	14.5	35.0
Hungary	220	400*	3.0	18.5	—	1.5*	—	20.0*
Rumania	135	218	5.0*	9.6	3.5	4.4	8.5	15.0
Bulgaria	71	140	3.6	12.8	0.2	0.5	3.8	12.5

Sources:

C: 1949: J. Dolansky, *op. cit.*, 1953: J. Dolansky in *For a Lasting Peace*, July 3, 1953.

P: H. Minc: Le Plan Sexennal (The Six Year Plan), *Notes et Etud. Doc.*, No. 1377, Paris, 1950; tractors: MTS-1953, E. Paszcolkowski, in *For a Lasting Peace*, June 12, 1953. Stat. 1948: *Rocznik Stat.* (Statist. Year), p. 60. 1953 estimated.

H: 1949 in *Hungary Today*. 1953 estimated on the basis of planned figures.

R: 1948: *Problems Economics* (Econ. Problems), No. 1, 1948. Gh.-Dej. in *For a Lasting Peace*, May 29, 1953.

B: Vulko Chervenkov in *For a Lasting Peace*, Sept. 11, 1953.

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●407 As in the USSR, mere numerical increase in farm machinery creates an exaggerated view of the increased efficiency achieved. Though the tractor emphasis of the Soviet planners of the early thirties was avoided in Eastern Europe, the capacity of farm machinery to solve agricultural problems continued to be overrated. The production record of those farms — many of them the vast State Farms in Czechoslovakia and Poland in which the available machinery was largely concentrated — barely exceeds that of the non-mechanized farms. The official press has frequently complained about the inefficiency of Machine and Tractor Stations and the personnel assigned to them, but these complaints reached a particularly high pitch when the New Course directed official attention to agriculture. "We could have . . . better results in the field of farm machinery," the Polish planner, Jacob Berman, complained at the Ninth Party Plenum in October 1953. "Is it normal," he asked, "that of 6,000 engineers in the Ministry of Machine Industry, only 72 work in factories for agricultural machinery?"[31] Other Communists have complained of the number of idle tractors, the rapid turnover of personnel in the MTS, and the long delays caused by lack of adequate repair facilities.

241 These oft-repeated complaints and the slow pace of agricultural development itself reinforce the impression that Communist claims of extensive mechanization of farms are exaggerated. In Poland, for instance, less than 10 per cent of farming is mechanized.[32] In Czechoslovakia, the most advanced country in the region, agricultural work was mechanized, according to Premier Siroky, up to 28 per cent in 1951 and 30 per cent in 1952. These figures hardly square with those given by Siroky for individual components of mechanized operation: plowing, 20 per cent; sowing, 13 per cent; and tending of crops, 0.08 per cent. Siroky himself expressed great dissatisfaction with the progress of farm mechanization:

> Especially here in Czechoslovakia we had all the prerequisites for ensuring that Socialist industry would effectively contribute to the development of agricultural production, both in the State farms and cooperatives, and in the private sector. However, the aid on the

[31] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) November 6, 1953.

[32] At the end of the Six Year Plan (1956) 18.8 per cent of Polish agriculture is to be mechanized (*Nowe Drogi*, July-August, 1950, p. 212). This is to include 80,000 tractors. Since by the end of 1953 approximately 40,000 tractors were in operation, it can be assumed that approximately half of the projected 18.8 per cent mechanization had been achieved, although it is probably much less.

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241 511 433 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

[134] The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

231 241 LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	43.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

● 407 241 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery, the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechanical equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors:

ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	*Year*	*Number (thousands)*	*Arable land per Tractor (hectares)*
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(Ibid. p. 208). †state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

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sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	*Second 1937*	*Third 1942*	*Fourth 1950*
Some Means of Consumption				
Cotton goods (milliard metres) ..	4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Woollen goods (million „) ..	270	220	177	159
Linen (million metres)	500	600	985	—
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) ..	1,100	750	850	880
Sugar (million tons)	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.4
Some Means of Production				
Electric Current (million kwh.) ..	22	38	75	82
Coal (million tons)	75	152.5	243	250
Pig iron (million tons)	10	16.0	22	19.5
Steel (million tons)	10.4	17	28	25.4
Oil and gas (million ons) ..	21.7	46.8	54	35.4

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95-110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.